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On the structure and the qualitative behavior of an economic model
Advances in Difference Equations volume 2013, Article number: 169 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, we build an economic model of a non-linear system of difference equations and present a qualitative study for the obtained model, where a mathematical model of a bounded rationality multiple game with an exponential demand function will be introduced, and then we obtain the equilibrium points of the model and classify if they are locally stable or not. Also, we investigate the boundedness and global convergence of solutions for the obtained system.
1 Introduction
In the recent years, the study of the bounded rationality duopoly game has attracted a very high attention. In 1998 Bischi and Naimzada [1] introduced the bounded rationality duopoly game as a modification of the original model work of Cournot [2], where they proposed the duopoly game which describes a market with two players producing homogeneous goods, updating their production strategies in order to maximize their profits. Each player thinks with bounded rationality, adjusts his output according to the expected marginal profit, therefore the decision of each player depends on local information about his output. Also, they have studied the bounded rationality duopoly game with a simple case when the demand function and the cost function are linear [1]. Recently, many works of bounded rationality duopoly game have been studied [1, 3–11]. Agiza et al. [5] studied the complex dynamics in a bounded rationality duopoly game with a nonlinear demand function and a linear cost function. The asymptotic behavior of the economic model was investigated by El-Metwally [12].
The main aim for this paper is to analyze the dynamics of a nonlinear discrete-time map generated by a bounded rationality duopoly game with an exponential demand function. In Section 2 we present and describe a bounded rationality duopoly game with an exponential demand function. The existence of the equilibrium points of the obtained model and the studying of their local stability are given in Section 3. The boundedness of the solutions is studied in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is concerned with the global attractivity of the solutions for the obtained system.
Now consider the following first-order system of difference equations:
where f and g are continuous functions on a subset .
Definition System (∗) is competitive if is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in y, and is non-increasing in x and non-decreasing in y. If both f and g are nondecreasing in x and y, System (∗) is cooperative. Competitive and cooperative maps are defined similarly. Strongly competitive systems of difference equations or strongly competitive maps are those for which the functions f and g are coordinate-wise strictly monotone.
Theorem A [13]
Let be a monotone map on a closed and bounded rectangular region . Suppose that T has a unique fixed point in S. Then E is a global attractor of T on S.
2 The model
We consider a Cournot duopoly game with denoting the quantity supplied by firm . In addition, let , , denote a twice differentiable and non-increasing inverse demand function and let denote the twice differentiable increasing cost function. For the firm i, the profit resulting from the above Cournot game is given by
Since the information in the oligopoly market is incomplete, the bounded rational players have no complete knowledge of the market, hence they make their output decisions on a local estimate of the expected marginal profit [14]. If the marginal profit is positive (negative), it increases (decreases) its production at the next period output. Therefore the dynamical equation of the bounded rationality player i has the form
where is a positive parameter which represents the relative speed of adjustment. Bischi and Naimazada studied the dynamical behavior of the bounded duopoly game with a linear demand function [14].
To make the bounded rationality duopoly game more realistic, we assume that the demand function has the exponential form (see [15])
where a is a parameter of maximum price in the market. The exponential demand function has the good properties of non-zero or non-negative prices and finite prices when the total quantity in the market Q tends to zero. So, we think that the exponential demand function is a good alternative to the linear demand function and makes the game more realistic. Also, we consider the cost function is linear and is given by
where is the marginal cost of the i th firm. Thus the profit of the i th firm is given by
Then marginal profit of i th firm is
Thus the repeated duopoly game of bounded rationality by using Eq. (2) is given by
Therefore the discrete two-dimensional map of the game has the form
Now we can rewrite this system in the following form:
where , , , and , .
3 Local stability of the equilibrium points
In this section, we examine the existence of non-negative equilibrium points of System (9) and then give a powerful criterion for the asymptotic stability of the obtained points.
Proposition 1 (1) When and , System (9) has a unique equilibrium point .
(2) When and , System (9) has two equilibrium points and , where and satisfy and , respectively.
(3) When , System (9) has a unique positive equilibrium point , where satisfies , , and .
Proof Observe that the equilibrium points of System (9) are given by the relations
Therefore
First, set . Then
Therefore is the unique critical point of g and is the absolute maximum of g on . Now we consider the following two cases.
(1) If , then for all and so has no positive roots. Similarly, it is easy to show that the function has no positive roots provided that . Thus System (9) has the unique equilibrium point .
(2) If , then and since for all , has a unique positive root. Since , the positive root of lies in . So, the equation has a unique solution . Similarly, it is easy to show that the equation has a unique solution provided that . Therefore System (9) has the equilibrium points and where and satisfy and , respectively.
Second, assume that is a solution of System (10) with and . It follows from (10) that and have to be less than one and
which gives that , where . Now set , where and . Similarly to above, one can easily see that h has no positive roots if and it has a unique positive root which lies in whenever . Therefore System (9) has the unique positive equilibrium point where satisfies and . □
Recall that , and are called boundary equilibrium points of System (9) and is called a Nash equilibrium point of System (9). See [3].
In the following, we deal with the local stability of the equilibrium points of System (9). Now rewrite System (9) as follows:
where and are continuous functions. Then we obtain
Proposition 2 The equilibrium point of System (9) is locally asymptotically stable if for and it is unstable elsewhere.
Proof The Jacobian matrix of System (9) about the equilibrium point has the form
Therefore the eigenvalues of are given by
It is well known that the equilibrium point of System (9) is locally asymptotically stable if both and are satisfied if and . The proof is completed. □
Proposition 3 The equilibrium points and of System (9) are saddle points.
Proof The Jacobian matrix of System (9) about the equilibrium point has the form
Thus has the eigenvalues
Note that
and
Thus it follows that the equilibrium point of System (9) is a saddle point. Similarly, one can easily prove that the equilibrium point of System (9) is also a saddle point. □
Proposition 4 The Nash equilibrium point of System (9) is asymptotically stable if and it is unstable elsewhere.
Proof The Jacobian matrix of System (9) about the equilibrium point is
By some simple computations, we obtain that
It is well known that the Nash equilibrium point of System (9) is asymptotically stable if and , i.e., the following condition is satisfied:
This completes the proof. □
4 Boundedness and invariant
In this section we concern ourselves with the boundedness character of the solutions for System (9). Under appropriate conditions, we give some bounded results related to System (9).
Theorem 5 Assume that , . Then every solution of System (9), with and , satisfies that and for all .
Proof Let , , be continuous functions defined by
Then System (9) can be rewritten in the form
Now assume that is a solution of System (9) with positive initial values. Then it suffices to show that , , are positive for all , . Observe that
Therefore and have no positive critical points. Let a and b be arbitrary positive numbers and consider the domain
Then for , we see that
Using elementary differential calculus, we obtain that the absolute minimum of each one of the above functions is . Therefore for all . Since a and b are arbitrary positive numbers, we can conclude that for and for all . □
Theorem 6 Let be a solution of System (9) with for some and assume, for , that one of the following statements is true:
(i) .
(ii) .
(iii) .
Then for all .
Proof Let be such that . It follows from System (9) that
and
Set for . Then it follows from (13) that . Also, we obtain that
and
Then . If (i) holds, then and hence is increasing on . Therefore . If (ii) holds, then (14) yields .
Now suppose that (iii) holds. In this case, it follows from (15) that , where for all . It is not difficult to see that is the absolute maximum of on where . According to (iii) and since , . That is, in all cases we obtain that whenever yields . So it is easy to prove by induction that for all . The proof of is similar and so will be omitted. This completes the proof. □
Theorem 7 For every solution of System (9), the following statements hold:
(i) , .
(ii) , .
Proof We obtain, for , from System (9) that
Then it follows by Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 that Case (i) is true. The proof of Case (ii) is similar and will be omitted. □
The following corollaries are coming immediately from Theorem 7.
Corollary 8 Assume that is a positive solution of System (9) with for some . Then for all .
Corollary 9 Every positive solution of System (9) is bounded. Moreover,
and
Theorem 10 Assume that is a positive solution of System (9) and assume, for , that one of the following conditions is true:
(i) .
(ii) , and , where .
Then there exists such that for all .
Proof The proof of the theorem, when (i) holds, follows by Corollary 9. Now consider that (ii) is true. Then it follows from Corollary 9 that for every constant , there exists such that , . Set . Since when and the inequalities in (ii) hold, depending on the continuity in of the left-hand side of each inequality in (ii), one can choose so small that
and
Now we obtain from System (9) that
where , and then
and
On the other hand, the equation
has the positive roots
Observe that if and only if which holds by (16). Therefore . Consequently, for all , which yields by (17) that . Using the increasing property of on and inequality (18), we see that . Since , it follows that
Similarly, one can easily prove that . This completes the proof. □
Theorem 11 Assume that is a positive solution of System (9). If either
or
where for , then there exists such that for all .
Proof Assume that , and the function are defined as in the previous proof. Then
where , . Thus
Hence, attains its maximum value at , that is,
Also,
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 10, we can choose so small that our assumptions imply
Therefore we have either
or
which is our desired conclusion for . Similarly, one can accomplish the same conclusion for . So, the proof is complete. □
5 Global stability analysis
In this section we are interested in driving conditions under which the equilibrium points of System (9) are attractors of the solutions for System (9).
In the following theorem, we investigate the global attractivity of the equilibrium point of System (9).
Theorem 12 Assume that , . Then is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9).
Proof Let be a solution of System (1). It follows from System (1) that
and
Then there exist and such that and . Since the only possible values of in the present case are , and . This completes the proof. □
In the following theorems, we investigate the global attractivity of the positive equilibrium point of System (9), where and are given by and , respectively.
Theorem 13 Assume that , . Then the unique positive equilibrium point of System (9) is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9).
Proof Let be a solution of System (9) and let (the case whenever is similar and it will be left to the reader). Since , then , where . Thus . Therefore we obtain from System (9) that
Then the sequence is increasing and since it was shown that it is bounded above, then it converges to the unique positive equilibrium point . Similarly, assume that (the case whenever is similar and it will be left to the reader). Since , then , where . Thus . Therefore we obtain from System (9) that
Then, again, the sequence is increasing, and since it was shown that it is bounded above, then it converges to the unique positive equilibrium point . Thus converges to . □
Theorem 14 Consider and and assume that . Then the unique positive equilibrium point of System (9) is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9).
Proof Let be a solution of System (9). It follows from System (9) that
Thus we see from Corollary 9 that
Then the sequence is increasing and since it is bounded, then it converges to the unique positive equilibrium point . Similarly, it is easy to show that the sequence is also convergent to the unique positive equilibrium point : Therefore converges to and then the proof is complete. □
Theorem 15 Consider and and assume that one of the following conditions holds:
(I) .
(II) .
Then the unique positive equilibrium point of System (9) is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9).
Proof Rewrite System (9) as follows:
where and are continuous functions. Now consider the system
Then
Thus either or
Then , and . Now since , then , that is,
We claim that ; otherwise, for the sake of contradiction, assume that (the case where is similar and it will be left to the reader). Then , which is a contradiction.
Now it is easy to see that
Thus
Now, there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: Suppose that . Therefore the function has no real roots. Thus . Similarly, it is easy to prove that . Then it follows by Theorem A that the equilibrium point of System (9) is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9).
Case 2: Suppose that . Since , , or , and since , then . Thus . Similarly, it is easy to prove that . Then it follows again by Theorem A that the equilibrium point of System (9) is a global attractor of all positive solutions of System (9). Thus the proof is now completed. □
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Acknowledgements
This paper was funded by the Deanship of Scientific Research (DSR), King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia under grant No. (662-009-D1433). The author, therefore, acknowledge with thanks DSR technical and financial support. Last, but not least, sincere appreciations are dedicated to all our colleagues in the Faculty of Science, Rabigh branch for their nice wishes.
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El-Metwally, H.A. On the structure and the qualitative behavior of an economic model. Adv Differ Equ 2013, 169 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1186/1687-1847-2013-169
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/1687-1847-2013-169